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DEFINING THE STRIKE ZONE-AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF
PRIOR CONVICTIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL "THREE-STRIKES AND YOU'RE
OUT" SCHEME
What man was ever content with one crime?'
INTRODUCTION
On September 13, 1994, President Clinton fulfilled a promise
made during his February 1994 State of the Union address by signing
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the
"Act"). 2 A political cornerstone of the Act provides for mandatory life
imprisonment for persons convicted of a third violent felony.' This
provision mandates the long-term removal from society of the nation's
most dangerous repeat offenders.' Congress enacted the mandatory
life imprisonment scheme (the "three-strikes law" or "three-strikes stat-
ute") against a national backdrop of anti-crime fervor that kindled the
Juvenal, Satires, in THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 68 (David Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986),
2 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796; William Claiborne, State Legislators Rethink "3 Strikes" Laws as Costs Begin to Hit Home,
WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1994, at A18; Ana Puga, Crime Specialists Fault 3 Strike Rule—They Dismiss
Life Terms for Violent Repeat Offenders as Mostly Empty Rhetoric, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 1994, at
14.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (West Supp. 1995). The relevant provision provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted in a court
of the United States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to life imprison-
ment if—
(A) the person has been convicted (and those convictions have become final) on
separate prior occasions in a court of the United States or of a State of-
(i) 2 or more serious violent felonies; or
(ii) one or more serious violent felonies and one or more serious drug offenses;
and
(B) each serious violent felony or serious drug offense used as a basis for sentencing
under this subsection, other than the first, was committed after the defendant's
conviction of the preceding serious violent felony or serious drug offense.
Id.
4 Housit Comm. oN THE JUDICIARY, MANDATORY LIFE IMPRISONMENT FOR PERSONS CON-
VICTED OF A THIRD FELONY, H,R. REP. No. 463, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1994).
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consideration of similar provisions by more than sixteen state legisla-
tures.'
While the three-strikes law is the latest vogue in the popular
anti-crime political rhetoric, recidivist laws existed in the American
colonies as early as 1692.° Modern recidivist statutes implement a
policy of selective incapacitation, seeking to identify and then remove
from society for long periods of incarceration those criminals most
likely to become repeat offenders.? Selective incapacitation's general
premise is that imprisonment does not rehabilitate this core group of
career criminals. 8 Lengthy prison terms imposed under recidivist stat-
utes serve to remove this selective group from society and prevent them
from committing more crime. 9 Nationally publicized gruesome crimes
perpetrated by repeat offenders and general media coverage of violent
crime statistics seem to have driven the public opinion polls, placing
criminal violence as a top priority among voters. 19 Public concern over
5 Stephen Braun & Judy Pasternak, A Nation with Peril on Its Mind; Crime Has Become the
Top Concern of Many People. Much of the Anxiety Is Fueled' by a Perception of Violence, Not the
Statistics, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, at Al; Richard Lacayo, Lock 'Ern Up! . . . With Outraged
Americans Saying That Crime is Their No. I Concern, Politicians are Again Talking Tough. But are
They Talking Sense?, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 50.
6 Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 1-1Aftv,
L. REv. 511, 511 n.1 (1982). The Massachusetts Bay Colony enforced enhanced sentences for
repeat robbers and burglars as early as 1692. Id. The Virginia House of Burgesses in 1705 passed
a provision aimed at thwarting the persistent problem of hog stealing by mandating harsher
sentences for each subsequent conviction. Id. Recidivist is defined as "a habitual criminal; a
criminal repeater." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990). Habitual offenders, repeat
offenders, recidivists, career criminals and "three-time losers" are all synonymous terms used to
describe the class of criminals these laws seek to punish, James E. Hooper, Bright Lines, Dark
Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 195i, 195 1
n.2 (1991). Today, every state in the nation authorizes increased punishment for repeat offenders.
Alex Glashausser, Note, The Treatment of Foreign Country Convictions as Predicates for Sentence
Enhancement Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DUKE LJ. 134, 134 (1994).
7 Hooper, supra note 6, at 1953; Note, supra note 6, at 512. The selective incapacitation
theory works from the premise that certain individuals are impervious to the rehabilitation efforts
of the criminal justice system. Hooper, supra note 6, at 1953. Studies show that a core group of
unresponsive criminals likely will be responsible for an inordinate proportion of the crimes
committed in society. Id. at 1951 n.3. The landmark recidivist study, conducted by Wolfgang,
Figilio and Sellin, examined the criminal records of 10,000 young males born in Philadelphia in
1945, showing that of the 10,214 crimes committed by the group, 51.9% of the crimes were
committed by 627 males of the total group examined (18% of total group). Note, supra note 6,
at 514 n.20 (citing M. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 88 (1972)).
8 Hooper, supra note 6, at 1953.
"Irl. at 1953-54; Note, supra note 6, at 512. Although relevant to the general issue of the
effectiveness of mandatory life statutes, this Note does not discuss whether past criminal history
provides is reliable predictor of recidivism. See Note, supra note 6 for a discussion of the ability
to predict recidivism.
Braun & Pasternak, supra note 5, at Al. Braun and Pasternak noted that although the
violent crime rate actually dropped 3% during first six months of 1994, more than 43% of people
surveyed in January 1994 placed crime issues at the top of the nation's most important problems.
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crime made the three-strikes law, amenable to the sound bite "three-
strikes and you're out," especially popular among legislators.'
Political conservatives latched onto the public sentiment and
called for an inclusive three-strikes law that would seek to combat the
problem of violent crime on a national level." 2
 Civil libertarians and
others strongly denounced any attempt by the federal government to
jump on the three-strikes bandwagon.t 3
 The opponents maintained
that the deterrent effects of such a law would be minimal compared
to the increased costs of providing long-term care to nonviolent geri-
atric prisoners."' Additionally, opponents claimed that the likely dispro-
portionate effect of the law on African-Americans, Latinos and Native-
Americans would only worsen the racially imbalanced sentencing
procedures of the federal courts. 15
Congress chose a mid-ground approach by meting out harsh pun-
ishment only to those offenders whose criminal history included prior
convictions classified as "serious drug offenses" or "serious violent
felonies.'" Additionally, Congress sought to appease other concerns by
making enforcement voluntary for Native-American tribal govern-
Id. This figure rose from 21% who placed crime as the most important problem in a June 1993
poll. Id.; see also Edwin Meese III, Three Strikes Laws Punish and Protect, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP.
58, 58 (1994) (murders or teenager Polly Klaas in California, Michael Jordan's father James in
North Carolina and others by repeat violent offenders triggered massive reaction among law-abid-
ing citizens).
II See Braun & Pasternak, supra note 5, at Al. The popularity or these provisions garnered
support from both ends of the political spectrum. Pierre Thomas, Violent Strikes a Chord Coast to
Coast "3
-Time Loser" Laws Find Diverse Support, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1994, at. Al (suiting both
New York Governor Mario M. Cuomo, a Democrat, and California Governor Pete Wilson, a
Republican, supported three-strikes measures). As of March 1995, 15 states had enacted some
type of three-strikes sentence enhancement scheme, and nearly every state provides for increased
sentences for multiple felony convictions. Robert 1-leglin, A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means:
"Three Strikes and You're Out", 20 j. Laois. 213, 215-16 (1994); -Hooper, supra note ti, at 1952.
L2
 140 CONG. REC. 112432-33 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Packard Statement]
(statement by Rep. Packard condemning Democratic version of three-strikes bill as weak). The
initial Senate three-strikes provisions, passed in November 1993, are indicative of the wide scope
of the three-strikes law envisioned by some advocates. See H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2408,
5111 (1993) (allowing drug convictions to count as all three strikes and including crimes against
property as qualifying crimes); Heglin, supra note 11, at 229-30.
15 H.R. REP. No. 463, supra note 4, at 5-6 (listing opponents testifying at hearings on H.R.
3981); Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 3315 Before the
Subcomm, on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. On thefudieiary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (statement of Jesse Jackson, President, National Rainbow Coalition), available in Westlaw,
USTESTIMONY database, File No. 1994 WL 222636 [hereinafterfacksan Statement]; see also Marc
Mauer, "Three Strikes and You're Out" Politics, Crime Control . And Baseball?, Cam, JUST., Fall
1994, at 30.
14 See 1i,R. REP. No. 463, supra note 4, at 5, 6; Puga, supra note 2, at 14.
15 See Jackson Statement, supra note 13; Puga, supra note 2, at 14; see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMM., ANALYSIS OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL. AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1993 - H.R.
3355 12 (1994) [hereinafter SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT]; Mauer, supra note 13, at 63.
111 See H.R. REP. No. 463, supra note 4, at 3-4 ("[The] 'Three-strikes and You're Out,' [bill]
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ments, allowing for parole of prisoners over seventy years old and
permitting only one of the first two strikes to be a drug offense."
Moreover, the Act provided that in limited circumstances defendants
could prevent the sentencing court from counting an otherwise
qualified prior conviction."
The three-strikes law serves as a sentence enhancement provision
for those recidivist criminals with qualifying prior criminal histories
who stand convicted of a serious violent felony in a federal court." A
qualifying criminal history includes either two prior serious violent
felony convictions or one prior serious violent felony conviction and
one serious drug conviction. 20 Prior state and federal convictions may
qualify as strikes for purposes of sentence enhancement. 2 ' Finally, each
serious violent felony or serious drug offense used as a basis for sen-
tence enhancement, other than the first, must have been committed
after the preceding strike's conviction date. 22
The three-strikes law provides an extensive definition section that
establishes which prior felonies qualify as "serious drug offense" strikes
and "serious violent felony" strikes. 23 The law specifically enumerates
qualifying "serious drug offenses" as federal convictions of specified
sections of the Controlled Substances Act or the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act. 24 State drug offenses may also qualify as strikes
when, if the offense had been prosecuted in a federal court, it would
have been punishable under specified sections of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act or the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. 25
is designed to take the nation's most dangerous recidivist criminals off the streets and imprison
them for life.").
17 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3559(c) (1) (a), (c) (6), 3582 (West Supp. 1995).
IR Id. § 3559(c) (3).
19 Id. § 3559(c); H.R. Ria,. No. 463, supra note 4, at 3-4.
2° 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (1).
21 Id. § 3559(c)(1)(A).
22 Id. § 3559(c)(1)(B). Stated another way, the date of the first strike's conviction must be
before the date of the conduct that results in the second strike's conviction. Id. This requirement
deals with a problem that has arisen for courts counting convictions under the Armed Career
Criminal Act. See Hooper, supra note 6, at 1967-68 (noting three different methods employed
by courts in counting convictions for sentence enhancement under the ACCA).
25 1d. § 3559(c) (2) (F), (H).
24 Id. § 3559(c)(2)(H). The relevant portion of the statute states: "[t]he term 'serious drug
offense' means an offense that is punishable under section 401(b) (1) (A) or 408 of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841 (b) (1) (A), 848) or section 1010(b)(1)(A) of the Con-
trolled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(A))." Id.
25 Id. The statute sets out in relevant part:
For purposes of this subsection . . . the term "serious drug offense" means ... an
offense under State law that, had the offense been prosecuted in a court of the
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The three-strikes sentencing scheme employs a dual-category
structure to define prior offenses that count as "serious violent felony"
strikes. 29 The categories of qualifying prior offenses include both enu-
merated and nonenumerated crimes. 27 Interpreting one of the two
existing federal recidivist provisions employing a similar dual-category
structure, the United States Supreme Court, in its 1990 Taylor v. United
States decision, held that sentencing courts analyzing prior convictions
under the similarly structured "violent felony" definition of the Armed
Career Criminal Act (the "ACCA") must follow a formal categorical
approach.28 This approach limits sentencing courts' inquiry to the
statutory definition of the prior offense and the fact of conviction. 29 It
prohibits any inquiry into the particular facts underlying the prior
conviction." Similarly, courts interpreting the "crime of violence"
definition in the Career Offender recidivist provision of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (the "Career Offender provision") also
have adopted the formal categorical approach set down in Taylor." The
language and definitional structure related to classifying prior convic-
tions for sentence enhancement in the ACCA, Career Offender provi-
sion and the three-strikes law are almost identical." Thus, courts inter-
preting the new three-strikes provision will likely adopt the Taylor
categorical approach as well when attempting to classify prior offenses
as enumerated strikes."
In contrast to the ACCA and the Career Offender provisions,
however, the three-strikes statute provides defendants a limited collat-
eral challenge to the use of otherwise qualifying nonenumerated
strikes and prior robbery or arson convictions." The statute does not
United States, would have been punishable under section 401(b) (1) (A) or 408 of
the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841(b)( I ) (A), 848) or section
1010(b)(1)(A) of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C.
960(b) (1) (A)).
Id.
26 H.R. REP. No. 463, ,supra note 4, at 8.
27 Id.
28 See United S ta tes v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
211 1d.
m Id. at 600, 602.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 ti.3 ( I st Cir. 1994) (concluding that Taylor
methodology was persuasive in interpreting similar Career Offender crime of violence definition);
Unites States v. McAllister, 927 F.2d 136, 139 (3d Cir.) (following 'Taylor methodology in Career
Offender context), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 111 (1991).
32 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988) and UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL, § 4B1.1—.2 (Nov. 1994) [hereinafter USSG] with IS U.S.C.A. § 3559(c).
33 See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
34 Compare 18 U.S,C.A. § 3559(c) (3) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and USK: § 4151.2.
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allow a general challenge to the validity of prior convictions." Rather,
criminals can preclude the use of a prior conviction by proving the
absence of three specific factual circumstances from the conduct un-
derlying the prior conviction." Absence of the these circumstances
indicates that the actual conduct surrounding the prior offense did
not pose a significant enough threat of harm toward another to merit
qualification as a serious violent felony." Even though the collateral
attack provision seems to be on its face a fair way to ensure that only
truly violent prior convictions are used for enhancement, its applica-
tion could prove problematic."
The United States Sentencing Commission estimated that be-
tween 284 and 689 prisoners will be sentenced each year under a
federal three-strikes scheme." Significant federal litigation will likely
develop over its interpretation and application.° Additionally, as part
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
federal funding of state prisons and state participation in regional
prisons were linked to states establishing laws similar to the federal
three-strikes provision.'" Thus, the possibility exists that state legisla-
tures will model their own three-strikes provisions after that of the
federal government, increasing the need for a clear understanding of
the federal three-strikes law.
This Note seeks to predict the likely methodology that courts will
employ when counting prior convictions under the new three-strikes
statute based upon how courts do so under existing federal recidivist
schemes. 42 It then will analyze the collateral attack provision of the
three-strikes statute, discussing potential problems with its applica-
tion.° Finally, this Note will propose amendments to the collateral
35 See 18	 § 3559(c) (3).
55 1d.
37 See id.
38 See infra notes 219-44 and accompanying text.
36 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 18, 19. These numbers were calculated
based upon analysis of the two three-strikes provisions proposed by the Senate in the Fall of 1993.
Id. The enacted three-strikes law differs from these proposed provisions. Thus, it is difficult to
determine whether the number of affected criminals will increase or decrease. A March 17,1995,
newspaper article reported that as of that date only seven criminals had been arrested and
targeted to receive the mandatory life sentence imposed by the three-strikes laws. Sam Vincent
Meddis, Federal Three-Strikes Law Getting Its First  Test In Iowa, USA TODAY, Mar. 17,1995, at 12A.
41} H.R. REF, . No. 463, supra note 4, at 11 (Congressional Budget Office estimate); cf. SEN-
TENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 13.
41 See Violent. Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, P.L. 103-332, §,§ 20101-02,
108 Stat. 1796,1815-16.
42 See infra notes 50-218 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 219-44 and accompanying text.
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attack scheme aimed at providing the same protections without the
inherent problems."
Part I describes the operation of the existing federal recidivist
statutes.45
 Part II discusses the development of the categorical approach
by the United States Supreme Court. 46
 Part III predicts how courts are
likely to interpret the "serious violent felony" definition in the three-
strikes law by conducting a survey of circuit court decisions on similar
sentencing provisions.47
 Part IV discusses the general availability and
specific operation of a defendant's collateral attack of prior convictions
and provides several criticisms, finding the collateral attack scheme a
flawed and inefficient system. 48
 Part V provides an alternative to the
collateral attack scheme and calls on Congress to address several po-
tential problems that exist in the statute as drafted. 49
I. EXISTING VIOLENT FELONY RECIDIVIST SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT
STATUTES: THE ACCA 8c CAREER OFFENDER PROVISIONS
Two existing federal recidivist sentencing schemes, the Armed
Career Criminal Act and the Career Offender provision of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, are similar in scope and operation by
requiring enhanced prison sentences for criminals with prior violent
felony convictions." Both the ACCA and Career Offender provision
define "violent felony" using legally analogous language and struc-
ture.51
 Moreover, courts uniformly apply the methodology developed
44 See infra notes 245-73 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
411 See infra notes 73-135 and accompanying text.
47
 See infra notes 136-218 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 219-44 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 245-73 and accompanying text.
5° Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (Armed Career Criminal Act) with USSG § 4B1.1 (Career
Offender provision),
51
 18 U.S.C, § 924(e); USSO § 9131.2(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act is codified at 18
U.S.C. § 929(e) and sets out in relevant part:
[TJhe term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or
carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by
imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that-
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B). The Career Offender provision defines crime of violence as:
1A1ny offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year that-
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in the interpretation of the ACCA when analyzing prior offenses under
the Career Offender provision. 52
A. Types of Qualifying Violent Felonies Under the ACCA
Congress designed the ACCA to increase federal law enforcement
system participation in the effort to curb the illegal acts of armed,
habitual criminals. 53 The ACCA imposes an enhanced prison sentence
for recidivist criminals convicted in a federal court for the unlawful
possession of a firearm.54 The law mandates a mandatory prison sen-
tence of fifteen years without parole for such criminals with at least
three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 55
The ACCA defines qualifying violent felonies through a dual-cate-
gory structure. 56 Enumerated crimes—burglary, arson and extortion,
for example—comprise the first category of prior offenses that qualify
as violent felonies. 57 "Nonenumerated crimes" make up the second
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.
USSG § 4B1.2.
52 United States v, Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994) (authority interpreting ACCA is
persuasive in interpreting the Career Offender provision); United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1992) (when classifying prior convictions in Career Offender context, Taylor is the
beacon by which we must steer"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1830 (1993); United States v. McAllister,
927 F.2d 136, 139 (3d Cir.) (applying Taylor in Career Offender analysis), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
111 (1991).
53 H.R. REP. No. 1073, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3661,
3661.
54 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The relevant portion is set out below:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three
previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g) (1) of this title for a
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different
from one another, such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and impris-
oned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to,
such person with respect to the conviction under section 922(g).
Id, Section 922(g) criminalizes possession of a firearm by any person convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
55 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The ACCA really could be characterized as a "four-strikes and you're
out" enhancement scheme. See id. The principal sponsors of the ACCA intended the law to be
used by local prosecutors as a leveraging tool when dealing with repeat offenders. Hooper, supra
note 6, at 1959-60. The basic premise was that repeat offenders would rather plead guilty to state
charges than face federal prosecution for unlawful firearm possession under the ACCA, which
mandated a 15-year minimum mandatory prison term. Id. at 1960.
56 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (B). See infra note 137 for the full text of the definition section.
57 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B). Prior convictions that have the same elements as the enumerated
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category of qualifying prior convictions. 5R Two sub-categories of none-
numerated crimes qualify as violent felonies.'' Nonenumerated-ele-
mental crimes require as an element of proof the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person of another and
qualify as violent felonies."' Finally, nonenumerated-inherent crimes,
which by their nature involve conduct that inherently poses a substan-
tial risk of physical injury to another, also qualify as violent felonies
under the ACCAP
B. The Career Offender Provisions of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines
The United States Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") con-
trol the sentencing phase of more than ninety percent of all federal
felony and misdemeanor criminal convictions. 62 The Guidelines use a
simple-looking numerical grid system with entry points based on a
defendant's "criminal history" on one axis and "offense levels" on the
other.° The defendant's offense level is based upon the statutory
conviction."' The Guidelines assign each federal criminal offense a
crimes, burglary, arson or extortions, qualify automatically as violent felonies. See Taylor, 995 U.S.
at 599; United States v. Cunningham, 911 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1990) (Oregon burglary
conviction with elements virtually identical to those of generic burglary is "violent. felony"), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991),
68 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B). This Note uses terms "enumerated" and "nonenumerated,"
which come from the House Report describing the federal three-strikes provision, to provide a
structure for the ACCA. See KR, REP, No. 463, supra note 4, at 8. The Note adds the "-elemental"
and "-inherent" suffixes to nonenumerated for case of use when referring to the two sub-catego-
ries of nonenumerated crimes.
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B).
60 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B) (i); see also United States v. Cook, 26 F.3d 507, 509 (4th Or.)
(holding obstruction of justice required element of threatened harm toward another to count
for sentence enhancement), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct, 373 (1994); United Slates v. Lujan, 9 F.3d 890,
891-92 (10th Cir. 1993) (prior convictions for manslaughter and robbery clearly had element of
force toward another); United States v, Preston, 910 F,2d 81, 86, 87 (3d Cir. 1990) (conspiracy to
commit robbery qualifies because of element of attempted use of physical force toward another),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991).
See United States v, O'Brien, 972 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir, 1992) (breaking and entering qualifies
as ACCA violent felony due to possibility of violent confrontation), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 210
(1993).
62
 USSG C11,1, PiA(5).
es Elizabeth T. Lear, Double Jeopardy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the Subsequent-
Prosecution Dilemma, 60 littooK, L. Rev. 725, 729 (1994). This very basic introduction in no way
does justice to the complex, even labyrinthine, computations necessary to determine a defen-
dant's sentencing range. See PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL. SENTENCING GuiDEL,INES (Phyllis
Skloot Bomberger & David J. Gottlieb eds., 3d ed. 1993 & Stipp. 1994) for a detailed discussion
of the issue.
Lear, supra note 63, at 731,
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"base offense level" and then adjust the "base offense level" either up
or down for other factors, such as the defendant's role in the offense
or acceptance of responsibility. 65 Courts calculate the defendant's
criminal history by analyzing the number, type and date of the crimi-
nal's prior convictions, These two numbers are then plotted on the
grid to determine the appropriate sentencing range in months.°
The Career Offender provision establishes the methodology used
to calculate the criminal history score for those defendants with at least
two previous convictions for crimes of violence and/or drug trafficking
offenses.68 The Career Offender provision mandates a prison sentence
range at or near the statutory maximum for the current offense when
a qualified defendant stands convicted in a federal court of a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense. 69 The language and struc-
ture of the Career Offender's crime of violence definition mimics that
of the ACCA almost to the word." Thus, similar to the ACCA's violent
felony definition, the crime of violence definition has two categories—
enumerated and nonenumerated crimes." Although some differences
do exist, the crime of violence and violent felony definitions operate
in basically the same fashion."
II. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO CLASSIFICATION OF PRIOR
CONVICTIONS: TAYLOR V. UNITED STATES
A principle issue in the qualification of prior offenses is the man-
ner and the extent of judicial inquiry into the prior convictions." The
overwhelming majority of felony prosecutions take place at the state
level. 74 States do not use a uniform criminal offense classification
system." The labels that state criminal statutes attach to offenses, such
65 See id.
"" See Hooper, supra note 6, at 1955 n.15.
67 Id.
66 USSG § 4B1.1. See infra note 137 for the full definition of the crime of violence. The
Career Offender provision defines controlled substance offense as any violation under state or
federal law for drug trafficking. USSG § 4B1.2(2).
69 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, Supra note 15, at 5.
75 See infra note 137 lOr the relevant text of both statutory sections. See also UNITED STATE.,S
SENTENCING COMM., MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT TIlE SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
Quest. No. 95 (7th ed. 1994) [hereinafter M.F.A.Q.I.
71 See USSG § 4B1.2(1); see also supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
72 See M.F.A.Q., supra note 71, at Quest. No. 93.
73 See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990).
74 See Packard Statement, supra note 12, at H2403 (stating that 95% of violent crimes fall
under state or local laws).
75 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 580.
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as second-degree burglary or conspiracy to commit burglary, do not
provide insight into whether the offense qualifies a violent felony
under the ACCA or Career Offender provision. 76
 Federal courts using
prior state convictions for sentence enhancement purposes need to
look beyond the state's label on the offense to determine whether it
qualifies as a violent felony." Thus, sentencing courts attempting to
qualify a prior conviction must either look into the conduct underlying
the offense or limit their inquiry to the offense's statutory definition. 78
A. A Categorical Approach: Taylor v. United States
In 1990, in Taylor v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously held that sentencing courts must employ a formal cate-
gorical approach when classifying prior convictions as violent felonies
for sentence enhancement purposes under the ACCA. 79 The Court
stated that this approach limited the scope of a sentencing court's
inquiry to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the
prior crime." The defendant in Taylor contested the use of two second-
degree burglary convictions from Missouri for sentence enhancement
under the ACCA. 81
 He claimed that neither offense actually involved
conduct likely to pose a substantial threat of harm to another." Defen-
dant Taylor reasoned, therefore, that the sentencing court could not
count the offenses as "burglaries" for sentence enhancement purposes
under the ACCA." The Court rejected Taylor's contention and held
that sentencing courts were not to consider the conduct underlying
76 See id. at 590; United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct,
1830 (1993).
77 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 502. This Note focuses on the problems associated with using state
convictions for federal sentence enhancement. Presumably the same problems hold true when
using prior federal convictions for sentence enhancement purposes, but there the definitions
and elements of proof are more easily determined by a federal sentencing court.
78 hi.
79 Id. at 602. Although Justice Scalia joined with the Court's holding, he did not join section
11 of the Court's opinion, in which the majority conducted a detailed analysis of the legislative
history of the ACCA. Id. at 603 (Scalia,,f., dissenting). Rather, justice Scalia penned a concurring
opinion to this part, stating that he saw no reason for such a detailed analysis of the legislative
history after the Court decided Congress mandated as modern generic definition for burglary. Id.
8° Id. at 602.
HI Id. at 579.
Tayktr, 474 U.S. at 579.
" Id. The Court reasoned that Taylor sought to remove his burglary convictions from the
reach of the statute by wrongly suggesting that, by placing the "otherwise" phrase after "burglary,"
Congress intended to include only an especially dangerous subclass of qualifying burglaries. Id.
at 506-98. The Court reasoned that neither legislative history nor the plain language of the statute
supported such a limited definition. Id. at 596-97.
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previous convictions, but rather were to focus their inquiry on the
statutory elements of the prior offenses, and in a narrow range of cases
could look to the charging papers and jury instructions."
In Taylor, defendant Arthur Taylor pled guilty to unlawful posses-
sion of a firearm by a felon in violation of a federal statute." Taylor
had four prior convictions: robbery, assault, and two second-degree
burglary convictions from Missouri. 86 Based on this, the government
sought a fifteen-year minimum mandatory prison term under the
sentence enhancement provision of the ACCA.87 Although Taylor con-
ceded that his prior robbery and assault convictions qualified as violent
felonies, he contested the classification of his Missouri second-degree
burglary convictions as such." Taylor contended that neither burglary
actually involved conduct likely to pose a substantial risk of physical
harm to another, and thus they should not count for sentence en-
hancement purposes under the ACCA." The district court disagreed
and imposed the fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentence.w
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affir-
med the district court's sentence. 9 ' The court reasoned that burglary
as used within the ACCA's definition of "violent felony" meant any
offense labeled burglary by a state's criminal laws. 92 The Eighth Circuit
held, therefore, that the district court did not err in finding that
Taylor's two Missouri second-degree burglary convictions qualified as
violent felonies for sentence enhancement purposes." Taylor appealed
to the Supreme Court."
The Supreme Court upheld the Eighth Circuit's affirmation but
disagreed with its reasoning, holding that sentencing courts should
84 Id. at 602.
8 '5 Id. at 578. Taylor pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which criminalizes the
possession of a firearm by an individual with a prior state or federal felony conviction. Id. Taylor's
guilty plea was conditioned upon his retention of the right to challenge the classification of the
two Missouri burglary convictions as qualifying "violent felonies." Id. at 579.
"Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578.
87 Id. at 579.
" Id.
" Id. During the nine of Taylor's burglary convictions, Missouri had seven different statutes
under which an individual could be charged with second degree burglary. Id. at 578 n.l. Each
of the seven statutes criminalized unlawful entry into a structure, but differed as to the type of
structure and the method of entry. Id.




" Id. The Court stated that it granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the courts of
appeals concerning the definition of burglary within the ACCA. Id.
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conduct a categorical inquiry into the statutory definition of a prior
offense to determine if it qualifies as a violent felony." Initially, the
Supreme Court determined the meaning of the term burglary as used
within the ACCA.`IG The Court investigated the legislative history of the
ACCA and concluded that Congress intended the term burglary to
have a uniform, modern definition, independent of the labels used by
various state criminal codes."' The Court determined that a prior
felony conviction qualifies as a generic burglary, and thus an enumer-
ated violent felony under the ACCA, where that prior offense contains
three elements: (1) unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining
in, (2) a building or structure, (3) with intent to commit a crime."
Thus, if the criminal's past conviction involved an offense that con-
tained the three elements set out above, regardless of its label, the
offense qualified as a violent felony for sentence enhancement pur-
poses,"
The Court then examined the situation of variance between the
statutory definition of the prior offense and the generic definition of
burglary.'" The Court opined that in some circumstances the prior
offense would arise under a state's statutory definition that provided a
more stringent definition of burglary than the generic definition Con-
gress intended.'°' The Court stated that these situations posed no
problem of qualifying the prior conviction for use in sentence en-
hancement, because simple proof of conviction indicated that the
prior fact finder found all of the necessary generic elements to reach
the guilty verdict. 102 The Court also noted that where the state statute
contained only minor changes in terminology, the prior offense still
would qualify if the state statute corresponded in substance to the
generic definition. 1 °3
Next, the Court addressed the situation of significant difference
between the statutory definition of a prior offense and the generic
definition of the enumerated violent felony.'° 4 In dealing with this
05 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590, 602.
" Id. at 590.
° 7 Id. at 581-91, 592, 598.
98 Id, at 599.
99 Id.
100 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599.
1 ° 1 Id. The Court gave the example of a burglary statute that requires a showing of intent to
engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to another, in addition to the three generic
elements mentioned previously. See id.
1 °2
 Id. at 599.
1 °3 Id.
104 Id. at 599-600. The Court provided two examples. Id. at 599. In the first example, one of
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circumstance, the Court chose to address the more general question
of whether a sentencing court could consider the conduct underlying
a prior conviction, a factual approach, or must limit itself to look only
to the statutory definition of a prior offense, a formal categorical
approach. 1 "5
 The Court noted that the courts of appeals uniformly
interpreted the ACCA as mandating a formal categorical approach and
found their reasoning persuasive.' 06
 The Court considered the plain
language of the statute, the lack of legislative history regarding the
elaborate fact-finding process it deemed necessary for a factual ap-
proach, and the practical effects of instituting a factual approach to
analyzing prior convictions.' 07 The Court reasoned these three factors
supported the contention that Congress intended a categorical ap-
proach. 108
The Supreme Court discussed several specific practical problems
that could arise from applying the factual approach."°° The Court
termed the practical administrative difficulties and potential unfair-
ness in carrying out a factual approach "daunting,""° Such an ap-
proach requires a detailed analysis of the entire course of conduct
surrounding a prior criminal offense, including both charged and
non-charged wrongdoing, which in some cases will require a mini-trial
of the previous circumstances."'
The Court stated that when the government asserted that the
defendant's actual conduct fit the generic definition of burglary, the
court would have to make a finding as to the nature of the conduct
the requirements of the generic burglary definition was eliminated, such as requiring the break-
ing to be unlawful. Id. In the second example, the prior conviction's statutory definition covered
a wider range of illegal conduct than that of the generic definition, such as criminalizing breaking
and entering an automobile, boat or railroad car. Id.
1 "5 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
1°6 Id.
107 Id. at 600-02.
IN 1d.
M M. at 601-02.
110 Taylrrr, 495 U.S. at 601.
111 See id. a 600. In this Note the term "charged conduct" refers to those actions by the
defendant, included in the indictment or information, that directly led to the prior conviction.
"Uncharged conduct" refers to all actions by the defendant while committing the crime that are
not specifically charged in the indictment. For instance, assume that the defendant was previously
convicted for criminal trespass. The elements of the crime include the unlawful entry or unlawful
remaining within a commercial building. Assume further that the state burglary statute includes
the elements of trespass but also requires an intent to commit a crime. The defendant's indict-
ment charged him with criminal trespass. The police report from the incident indicates that the
defendant was carrying a pry bar and attempting to open a cash register, but the government
decided not to prosecute the defendant based on his attempt to open the cash register. In this
example, the defendant's illegal entry into a commercial building comprises the charged conduct
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itself." The Court reasoned that this would require sentencing courts
to make factual findings neither completed nor required at the origi-
nal trial." 3
 Additionally, the Court noted that the prosecution's proof
at trial could constitute the only evidence capable of proving that the
defendant's conduct fulfilled the generic elements.'"
The Court then questioned whether sentencing courts should
limit the government to presenting trial transcripts or should allow
witness testimony as to the underlying conduct of the prior offense.' 15
Similarly, the Court questioned whether the defendant would then be
allowed to counter with additional witnesses, arguing that the alleged
underlying conduct either did not happen or did not conform to the
elements of the generic enumerated crime definition. 16 In essence, the
Court concluded that conducting a factual approach would require
what amounted to a new trial of the conduct surrounding the prior
conviction and implied that this would be a waste of judicial re-
sources. 117
Moreover, the Court suggested that a circumstance could arise in
which such a post factum inquiry could be constitutionally unsound."'
The Court hypothesized that a sentencing court could conclude that
the defendant's prior conduct constituted a violation of the enumer-
ated crime of burglary, although the jury in the prior offense did not
have to reach that same conclusion. "9
 The Court questioned whether
a defendant could challenge this later finding as abridging his or her
because it was the conduct used to obtain the conviction. The attempt to open the cash register
with the pry bar is the uncharged conduct because it was not required infbrmation for the trespass
conviction.
" 2
 hi. at 601.
123 Id. As an example, assume that the prior conviction was for criminal trespass and required
the filet finder only to determine that the defendant unlawfully entered a structure. Thus, intent
to commit a crime was not art essential element of proof for the simple trespass conviction. When
later attempting to use the prior conviction for sentence enhancement, however, the government
could present evidence that the prosecutor's theory of the case included an intent to commit
crime. A sentencing court could make a finding that the defendant intended to commit a crime.
114 Id, This could occur when the defendant did not put on a case during the prior proceed-
ing, but instead relied upon a belief that the prusection had failed to meet its burden of proof.
1111




119 Id. For example, assume that the defendants prior conviction arose under a state statutory
definition that did not require intent to commit a crime. Using the example from supra note
113, assume the defendant was convicted of trespass, which required a jury only to find unlawful
entry into it building. Under the factual approach, the government could then theoretically prove
that the defendant did indeed have intent to commit a crime, by introducing evidence showing
that the defendant was trying to open a cash register with a pry bar. IF the prosecutor proved
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right to a jury tria1. 120 Furthermore, the Court stated that when a
defendant plea bargains and pleads guilty to a crime less serious than
the offense originally charged, often no record of the underlying facts
is generated.' 21 The Court opined that even if the government could
prove the necessary facts in a plea bargained case, using the conviction
for sentence enhancement seemed unfair where the defendant pled
guilty to a lesser, non-burglary crime.' 22
The Court held, therefore, that the ACCA requires sentencing
courts to utilize a formal categorical approach, rejecting consideration
of any underlying conduct. 123 The Court reasoned that the categorical
approach may allow sentencing courts to look beyond mere statutory
definitions, however, when they cannot determine which factual ele-
ments comprised the prior offense.' 24 The Court posited that sentenc-
ing courts conducting extended categorical analyses could consider
the charging papers and jury instructions to determine whether the
jury was actually required to find all of the requisite elements for a
qualifying violent felony.' 25
In applying its holding to the facts of the case, the Court found
that the second-degree burglary statutes in effect in Missouri at the
criminal intent in the prior offense by a preponderance of the evidence, the judge could make
a finding that such intent was present. See Lear, supra note 63, at 733 ("Sentencing facts need
only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence."). The government thus can transform the
defendant's prior trespass conviction into a generic burglary conviction for purposes of sentence
enhancement.
12° Taylor, 495 U.S at 601.
121 Id. Using the example from supra note 119, assume that the original indictment was for
generic burglary—unlawful entry of a building with intent to commit a crime. Further assume
that the defendant pled guilty to the lesser charge of trespass—unlawful entry of a building. No
record related to the defendant's intent to commit a crime was likely to have been generated.
122 Id. at 601-02. Building on the example from supra note 121, this would mean using the
facts of the underlying prior convictions to use the defendant's trespass conviction as a qualifying
enumerated burglary conviction.
123
 Id. at 602.
124 Id. Ambiguity arises in two circumstances. Id. at 599. In some cases the statute under which
the defendant was convicted contains alternative elements for conviction. Id. Thus, a jury could
convict based on finding either elements A, B and C or elements A, B, and D. See id. In other
cases, the defendant's conviction record will not indicate which specific statute the conviction
arose under, but rather will state a generic title that refers to several similar statutes or subsections.
See id.
125 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. Thus, if the statutory definition of a crime as enumerated by the
ACCA required A, B and C, and the statutory definition of the prior offense required A, B and
C or 0, then a simple statutory comparison would not reveal whether the jury had to find all of
the requisite elements—the jury could have convicted based on finding A, B and D. See id.
Looking at the charging papers and jury instructions from the prior conviction may be helpful
in determining whether the prior conviction was based on a finding of A, B and C, which would
then qualify, or based on a finding of A, B and D, which would not qualify. See id.
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time of Taylor's conviction varied from the generic burglary definition
implied by the ACCA.' 26 The Court stated that Taylor could have been
convicted under any of seven burglary statutes, which covered the
illegal breaking and entering of various places including tents and
boats. 127 The Court stated that the appellate record did not indicate
under which specific second-degree burglary statute Taylor's convic-
tion resulted. 128 The Court reasoned, therefore, that the jury could
have convicted Taylor without finding that he entered a structure as
required by the generic definition.' 29 Thus, a simple categorical analysis
could not reveal whether a jury found Taylor had entered a structure. 159
The Court, therefore, remanded the case for further proceedings,
directing the lower court to conduct a modified categorical inquiry
consistent with its holding."'
In summary, the 'Taylor court held that sentencing courts class-
ifying prior convictions as qualifying violent felonies normally must
limit the scope of their inquiry to the fact of conviction and the
statutory definition of the prior offense. 12 The Court also noted that
in certain circumstances, however, sentencing courts may apply a
modified categorical approach. 133 Courts may look beyond the mere
fact of conviction and the statutory definition when necessary to prove
that the defendant's conviction actually falls within the ACCA's violent
felony definition.' 34 Applying the modified categorical approach, a
sentencing court may look to the charging papers and jury instructions
to determine the elements of the defendant's prior offense, but still
may not consider the facts underlying the prior convittion. 135
III. CLASSIFICATION OF PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS UNDER THE
"THREE-STRIKES" PROVISION BY COMPARISON TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE TA ILOR CATEGORICAL APPROACH
The three-strikes sentencing scheme employs a dual-category
structure to define prior offenses that count as "serious violent felony"
128 id.
127 Id. at 599-600.
128 Id. at 602.
129 See id.
i• Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
"I Id. Sec infra notes 178432 and accompanying text for a discussion of the decision on
remand.
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strikes.' 36 The structure and language used by the three-strikes provi-
sion bear a significant resemblance to both the ACCA's "violent felony"
and the Career Offender provision's "crime of violence" definitions." 7
Structurally, all three recidivist statutes provide for the qualification of
both enumerated and non-enumerated prior violent felonies.'" Al-
136
 H.R. RIT. No. 463, supra note 4, at 8.
137 Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c)(2)(F) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) and USSG
§ 4B1.2(1). 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (2)(F) is set out below:
[T)he term "serious violent felony" means a Federal or State offense, by whatever
designation and wherever committed, consisting of murder (as described in section
I 111); manslaughter other than involuntary manslaughter (as described in section
1112); assault with intent to commit murder (as described in section 113(a)); assault
with intent to commit rape; aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse (as described
in sections 2241 and 2242); abusive sexual contact (as described in sections 2244
(a) (1) and (a)(2)); kidnapping; aircraft piracy (as described in section 46502 of
Title 49); robbery (as described in section 2111, 2113, or 2118); carjacking (as
described in section 2119); extortion; arson; firearms use; or attempt, conspiracy,
or solicitation to commit any of the above offenses; and any other offense punish-
able by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another or that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (2) (F). The ACCA's violent felony definition is set out below:
[Tihe term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or
carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by
imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2)(B). The Career Offender's crime of violence definition is set out below:
The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or state law punish-
able by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another, or is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives,
or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.
USSG § 4B1.2(1). Additionally, an interpretive note to the Career Offender provision from the
U.S. Sentencing Commission states:
"Crime of violence" includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault,
forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit,
and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are included where (A) that offense has
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the
count of which the defendant was convicted involved use of explosives (including
any explosive material or destructive device) or, by its nature, presented a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another. Under this section, the conduct of which
the defendant was convicted is the focus of inquiry.
USSG § 4B1.2, comment (n.2).
1" Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c)(2) (F) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B) and USSG
§ 4B1.2(1). See supra note 137 for the text of all three statutes.
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though the three-strikes law lists qualifying enumerated violent felonies
with more detail than the ACCA and Career Offender provision, all
three statutes use almost identical language to define qualifying none-
numerated crimes.'"
In all likelihood, Congress drafted the three-strikes serious violent
felony definition with full cognizance of how courts had previously
interpreted the similarly worded and structured ACCA violent felony
definition."° When Congress enacted the three-strikes law, it knew that
courts had interpreted the Career Offender provision's crime of vio-
lence definition based on case law analyzing the ACCA's similar violent
felony definition because the two definitions were similarly structured
and worded."' Thus, by drafting the three-strikes serious violent felony
definition using wording and structure essentially identical to that of
the ACCA violent felony definition, Congress intended courts to inter-
pret the three-strikes law serious violent felony definition employing
the case law and analysis from the ACCA's violent felony context. 142
I" See supra note 137 for full text of all three statutory definitions.
I" Cf. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1036 (1992). In Franklin, a
Title IX private right of action case, the United States Supreme Court assumed that Congress was
aware that existing federal court decisions had interpreted a certain statute to mean "x", See id.
Congress did not alter the statute when amending certain sub-sections subsequent to these
decisions. hi The Court, using traditional methods of statutory analysis, thus concluded that
Congress intended that courts continue to interpret the law to mean "x". See id.
141 See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 n.3 (Ist Cir. 1994) (concluding that "Taylor
methodology was persuasive in interpreting similar Career Offender crime of violence definition);
Unites States v. McAllister, 927 F.2d 136, 139 (3d Cir.) (following Taylor methodology in Career
Offender context), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 111 (1991). Traditional methods of statutory analysis
provide that when Congress enacts a clause using language similar to an existing provision that
courts have interpreted one way, Congress intends the new clause to be interpreted the same as
the old clause. Gf Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1194 (1st Cir. 1994). ltt
Camtifidgeport, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit implied congressional
intent favoring an interpretation of an Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") provision
based upon how courts had interpreted a similarly worded Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act ("LMDA") provision. The court reasoned that Congress knew how courts inter-
preted LMDA when it enacted OSHA, and thus courts should interpret the similar language in
OSHA as it had been interpreted in LMDA. Id.
112 Gf. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1036; Cambridgepart, 26 F,3d at 1194. Additionally, the legislative
history of the language finally enacted by Congress supports the conclusion that Congress
intended the three-strikes law to be interpreted in the same manner as the AGCA. See SENTENCING
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 12-13. The initial Senate proposal, passed in the fall of
1993, contained two separate three-strikes laws, each of which defined qualifying violent felonies
differently. H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2408, 5111 (1993). The United States Sentencing
Commission criticized the Senate versions for not using the violent felony definition found in
the ACCA, stating that the ACCA's definition was well established in the case law and thus
precluded further litigation over its meaning. SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15,
at 13. From the language of the three-strikes provision eventually enacted into law, it appears that
Congress followed the Sentencing Commission's recommendations and changed the language
of the three-strikes law to take advantage of the existing ACGA and Career Offender case law.
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Thus, courts are likely to utilize the Taylor Court's formal categorical
approach when classifying prior convictions as serious violent felonies
for sentence enhancement purposes. 148
The three-strikes law reduces the qualifying crimes to two catego-
ries—enumerated and nonenumerated crimes.'" The first category,
enumerated serious violent felonies, contains specific offenses whose
elements are either set out within the law or explicitly established by
reference to existing federal criminal statutes. 148 The second category
of qualifying prior offenses, nonenumerated serious violent felonies,
contains those crimes punishable by at least ten years of imprisonment
that fit into either of two sub-categories—nonenumerated-elemental
and nonenumerated-inherent." 8 To qualify as a nonenumerated-ele-
mental violent felony, a prior offense must have included an element
of actual, attempted or threatened physical violence against another. 147
Prior convictions qualify as nonenumerated-inherent violent felonies
when the prohibited conduct inherently poses a substantial risk of
physical force against another. 148
A government prosecutor seeking sentence enhancement under
the three-strikes law must file an information prior to trial stating
which convictions he or she intends to use for sentence enhancement
purposes. 149 No such notification process exists in either the ACCA or
See supra note 137 for a comparison of the texts of the ACCA, Career Offender and three-strikes
laws.
143 See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
144 11.R. REP. No. 463, supra note 4, at 8.
145 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (2)(F) (i). The relevant portion is set out below:
[T]he term "serious violent felony" means a Federal or State offense, by whatever
designation and wherever committed, consisting of murder (as described in section
11 1 1); manslaughter other than involuntary manslaughter (as described in section
1112); assault with intent to commit murder (as described in section 113(a)); assault
with intent to commit rape; aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse (as described
in sections 2241 and 2242); abusive sexual contact (as described in sections 2244
(a) (1) and (a) (2)); kidnapping; aircraft piracy (as described in section 46502 of
Title 49); robbery (as described in section 2111, 2113, or 2118); carjacking (as
described in section 2119); extortion; arson; firearms use; or attempt, conspiracy,
or solicitation to commit any of the above offenses.
Id.
146 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (2) (F) (ii).
147 See id. The relevant portion provides that "any other offense punishable by a maximum
term of imprisonment of 10 years or more that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another . ." Id.
148 See id. The relevant portion provides that "any other offense punishable by a maximum
term of imprisonment of 10 years or more that ... by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense."
Id.
149 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (4). The law states that It) he provisions of section 411(a) of the
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the Career Offender provision.'" The three-strikes law directs that the
information conform to rules laid out in sub-section 851(a) of the
Controlled Substances Act.' 51 After the government proves the factual
existence of the prior convictions listed in the information, the sen-
tencing court likely will determine their qualification as a matter of
law.I 52
A. Enumerated Serious Violent Felonies
Sentencing courts will use a multi-part analysis when classifying
prior offenses as enumerated serious violent felonies.'" First, the prose-
cution must provide proof of conviction for each offense the govern-
ment desires the court to consider as an enumerated serious violent
felony.'" Then, the sentencing court must compare the statutory
definition of the prior offense to the definition of the enumerated
serious violent felony.'"
The sentencing court's primary concern is ensuring that each
element of the three-strikes law enumerated serious violent felony was
a required finding in the prior conviction.'" Substantial correspon-
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 851(a)) shall apply to the imposition of sentence under
this subsection." Id. Sec infra note 151 for the relevant text of 21 U.S.C. § 851(a).
16° See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); USSG §
151 18
	
§ 3559(c) (4). The relevant sub-section of the Controlled Substances Act sets
out:
No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be sentenced
to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before
trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an informa-
tion with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel
for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. Upon
a showing by the United States attorney that facts regarding prior convictions could
not with due diligence be obtained prior to trial or before entry of a plea of guilty,
the court may postpone the trial or the taking of the plea of guilty for a reasonable
period for the purpose of obtaining such facts, Clerical mistakes in the information
may be amended at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence.
21 U.S.C. § 851(a) (1) (1988).
152 ci United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1994) (Career Offender case in which
court held that qualification of prior offense was purely a legal question); United States v. Davis,
16 F.3d 212, 214 (7th Cir.) (ACCA case in which court held that classification of prior conviction
was issue of law), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 354 (1994).
153 See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990); United States v. O'Neal, 937 F.2d
1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1990).
154 See O'Neal, 937 F.2d al 1371 n.2 (defendant had five prior mate convictions that govern-
ment sought to use for enhancement).
155 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; United States v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 703, 707-08 (8th Cir.)
(hereinafter Taylor II] (affirming decision on remand from 495 U.S. 575), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
882 (1991).
155 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599; United States v. Lilian, 9 F.3d 890, 892 (10th Cir. 1993).
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dence between the elements of the prior offense with those of the
enumerated serious violent felony fulfills this burden.'" Additionally,
a more stringent statutory definition, requiring the enumerated
crime's elements plus others, assures a sentencing court that all of the
requisite elements were found.' 58
The three-strikes law lists fourteen specific crimes, ranging from
arson to murder, that qualify as serious violent felony strikes. 159 The
statute establishes the required elements of proof for each of the
enumerated crimes either by referring to an existing federal criminal
statute or by expressly defining the required elements of proof.m The
three-strikes law's list of enumerated serious violent felonies differs
from the ACCA and Career Offender provision's both by including
more crimes, and more significantly, by expressly setting out the re-
quired elements of each enumerated offense.' 6 ' In doing so, Congress
has made it more likely that courts will attempt to classify prior offenses
as enumerated serious violent felonies, because courts will not have to
waste judicial resources independently determining the elements of
each enumerated crime. 162
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in United States v. Sweeten provides an excellent example of how
157 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599; see also United States v. Cunningham, 911 F.2d 361, 363 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991).
158 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. For example, assume that a prior conviction for aggravated
burglary required that the defendant be armed with a deadly weapon. See id. at 596. This
requirement was in addition to the three elements necessary for the crime to qualify as the generic
enumerated burglary, i.e., unlawful entry of a building with the intent to commit a crime. Id. at
597. Therefore, the prior conviction certainly qualifies as burglary for sentence enhancement
purposes. Id.
1 55 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (2) (F); see supra note 145.
1 e'°18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). For instance, the statute lists murder as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1111 (1988) as a qualifying serious violent felony. Id. The statute defines arson as "an
offense that has as its elements maliciously damaging or destroying any building, inhabited
structure, vehicle, vessel, or real property by means of fire or an explosive." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3559(c) (2)(15).
161 Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (2)(F) (i) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and USSG § 4B1.2. Both
the ACCA and the Career Offender provision only list burglary, arson and the use of explosives
as enumerated crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2)(B) (ii); USSG § 4B1.2( I ). The application notes
following USSG § 4151.2 also state that "[c]rime of violence includes murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate
extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling." USSG § 4131.2, comment (n.2). These lists of
enumerated crimes, however, merely represent generic labels for various crimes without providing
the specific elements necessary for each crime. Thus, sentencing courts hoping to classify prior
offenses as one of the enumerated crimes first faced the task of determining the specific elements
of the enumerated crime. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592.
152 In Taylor, it took the Supreme Court 18 pages of detailed legislative history analysis to
determine the elements of the burglary as defined by the ACCA. Id. at 581-99. Justice Scalia
termed such an exercise unnecessary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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courts attempting to classify prior offenses as enumerated serious vio-
lent felonies likely will proceed: 63 In Sweeten, the government con-
tested the district court's disqualification of a prior Texas burglary
conviction for ACCA sentence enhancement: 64 The district court rea-
soned that the Texas burglary conviction did not quality because the
statutory definition of the crime included the illegal entry of vehi-
cles.'° The district court concluded, therefore, that a conviction could
have resulted without the jury having found the requisite ACCA ge-
neric burglary element of illegal entry of a building or structure.'"
The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that the term "vehicles" as used
in the Texas burglary statute included only those vehicles whose pri-
mary purpose was to serve as a dwelling, as distinguished from auto-
mobiles as used by the Supreme Court in Taylor.' 67 The court analo-
gized the burglary of a vehicle adapted to provide overnight
accommodations to that of a building or house, noting that it would
be more difficult for a burglar to enter unnoticed.' 68 The likely con-
frontation that made burglary of a building an inherently violent
felony would just as likely occur during a burglary of a mobile home. 16"
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Texas's definition of burglary of a
habitation fell within the generic definition of burglary as laid out by
the Supreme Court in 'Taylor, and thus the prior conviction qualified
as an enumerated violent felony under the ACCA.'"
In some cases, however, the sentencing court is unable to make a
determination based solely on proof of conviction and an analysis of
the prior offense's statutory definition: 7 ' The sentencing court may
not be able to determine under which subsection of a statute a previous
conviction arose.'"Additionally, the prior offense's statutory definition
may cover a wider range of activity than the enumerated serious violent
felony: 73 Therefore, a conviction may have resulted without the fact
109
	
933 F.2d 765, 771 (9th Cir. 1991).
1 " Id. at 768.
166 1d.
166 /d.
167 Id. at 770.
168 Sweeten, 933 F.2d at 771.
109 Id,
17° Id. The court went on to state emphatically that its determination of the qualification of
the prior conviction did not rest upon Texas state law or Filth Circuit law, but rather upon Ninth
Circuit law dealing with how the ACCA was to be interpreted within the Ninth Circuit. Sweeten,
939 F.2d at 771 n.l.
t71 United States v Lujan, 9 F.3c1 890, 892 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Taylor, 932 F.2d
703, 707-08 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 582 (1991).
172 United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990); Lujan, 9 F.3d at 892.
173 Lujan, U F,3d at 892.
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finder having been required to find all of the elements necessary for
an enumerated strike.' 74
The Supreme Court in Taylor indicated that in such circumstances
sentencing courts must look to the charging papers and jury instruc-
tions. 175 Most courts have not pedantically enforced this language,
which would require the prosecution to always produce jury instruc-
tions along with the indictrnent. 176 Rather, courts generally relax the
jury instruction requirement where another document demonstrates
that the fact finder established the truthfulness of the allegations in
the indictment.'"
Thus, sentencing courts classifying prior convictions as enumer-
ated serious violent crimes likely will follow the analysis of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's decision on remand,
Taylor a'78 The Supreme Court remanded the case to determine
whether Taylor's prior Missouri burglary convictions arose under a
version of the statute such that they could be classified as generic
enumerated burglaries according to the ACCA.' 79 Both charging pa-
pers from the Missouri convictions included language charging Taylor
with breaking and entering a dwelling house and building.m The court
reasoned that this language indicated that Taylor's convictions arose
under the version of the Missouri burglary statute criminalizing unlaw-
ful entry of a building or structure, and not those versions making such
entry of boats and rail cars illegal. 181 The Eighth Circuit concluded that
Taylor's prior convictions did contain the requisite elements of bur-
glary and thus were violent felonies for purposes of sentence enhance-
ment under the ACCA. 182
174 7'aylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
' 75 /d.
176 See, e.g., Lujan, 9 F.3d at 892 (holding sentencing court can consider indictment and
verdict form without jury instructions); United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding sentencing court can consider any document that unequivocally demonstrates jury
found all necessary elements); United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234, 1236 ( 1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer,
Cj.) (holding sentencing judges can consider uncontested pre-sentencing report to supplement
information in indictment).
177 See Lujan, 9 F.3d at 892; Parker, 5 F.3d at 1327.
178 See 932 F.2d 703, 707-08 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 882 (1991).
179 United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
m Taylor II, 932 F.2d at 707.
181 See id. at 709.
182 Id.; see also United States v. O'Neal, 937 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir. 1990) (indictment
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B. Nonenumerated Serious Violent Felonies
The second category of qualifying prior offenses, nonenumerated
strikes, are those crimes punishable by at least ten years of imprison-
ment that fit into either of two sub-categories: nonenumerated-elemen-
tal and nonenumerated-inherent.'" To qualify as a nonenumerated-
elemental strike, a prior offense must have included an element of
actual, attempted or threatened physical violence against another.' 84
Prior convictions qualify as "nonenumerated-inherent strikes" if their
commission inherently posed a substantial risk of physical force against
another.' 85
1. Nonenumerated-Elemental Serious Violent Felonies
Courts likely will follow the categorical approach previously de-
scribed in part III when classifying a prior conviction as a nonenumer-
ated-elemental strike.'" Rather than the multi-element matching re-
quired in the enumerated category, however, a sentencing court must
find only that the prior conviction required an element of actual,
attempted or threatened use of physical force against another.'" Thus,
a categorical statutory comparison under this sub-category is simpler
than that of the enumerated crime category; certain crimes qualify
almost automatically. 188 Sentencing courts still will need to look beyond
the prior conviction's statutory definition when it is ambiguous as to
whether the violence element was required to sustain the prior convic-
tion. 189
Courts needing to go beyond simple statutory comparison face a
potential issue arising in ACCA case law regarding the types of docu-
" See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (2) (F)(ii).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 See United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234, 1236 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Mathis,
963 F.2d 399, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991). The Ninth Circuit has not directly decided the issue, but has stated
in dicta that its interpretation of Thy/or indicates that the modified categorical approach, allowing
inquiry beyond statutory definition, may not be used other than to classify crimes as burglary.
See United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1326 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993).
187 See United States v. Cook, 26 F.3(1 507, 509 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 573 (1994);
Preston, 910 F.2d at 86.
188 United States v Lujan, 9 F.3d 890, 891-92 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding prior manslaughter
convictions readily qualify as a nonenumerated-elernental violent felony under the ACCA).
188 See Cook, 26 F.3d at 509. See supra note 124 for other examples of when such ambiguity
could arise.
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ments courts may use in such an inquiry."° Several courts of appeals
have suggested that sentencing courts may consider all judicially no-
ticeable documentation or other relevant documentation.' 9 ' In 1992,
in United States v. Harris, then Chief judge Stephen Breyer, writing for
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, noted that a
sentencing court may consider information from an unchallenged
presentence report ("PSR" )' 92 when determining whether a prior
crime qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA.'" The court stated
that in such circumstances it is reasonable to consult the FSR, not to
determine the violent or non-violent nature of the conduct, but to
determine whether the conduct may indicate what offense the govern-
ment and defendant thought was at issue.'" The First Circuit con-
cluded that sentencing courts could then use this information to de-
termine which specific statutory offense served as the basis for the
prior conviction.' 95
t90 Compare Parker, 5 F.3d at 1327 (requiring documents that unequivocally demonstrate that
the jury's findings support the contention that all requisite elements were found) with Harris,
964 F.2d at 1236-37 (allowing consideration of an unchallenged presentence report to determine
the definition of the prior offense).
191 Carlton F. Gunn, So Many Crimes, So Little Time: The Categorical Approach to the Charac-
terization of a Prior Conviction Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 7 Fan. SF:NTENCING REP. 66,
67-68 & n.8 (1994) (citing United States v. Maness, 23 F.3d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1994) (allowing
consideration of transcript of guilty plea); Harris, 964 F.2d at 1236 (allowing consideration of
presentence report); United States v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765, 771 (9th Cir. 1991) (allowing
consideration of judicially noticeable documentation only)).
192 The United States Sentencing Guidelines mandate that the federal probation department
complete a presentencing report on each individual convicted of a federal crime. USSG . 6A1. ;
see Fan. R. CRIM. P. 32(c). The reports contain general information about the defendant,
including prior criminal history and other circumstances deemed helpful to a court in determin-
ing the sentence of the defendant. Fan. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) (2)(A). These reports often contain
factual information regarding the current offense, as well as background material on circum-
stances surrounding prior criminal offenses. See Harris, 964 F.2d at 1236-37.
193 /d. at 1236. In Harris, the federal government sought to use a Massachusetts assault and
battery conviction for sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Id. at 1235. The Massachusetts
assault and battery statute prohibited both violent and non-violent behavior. Id, at 1235. The
defendant pled guilty to the prior assault and battery charge, and no jury instructions existed to
provide independent verification of which version the defendant pled. Id. at 1236. The court
stated that "case files" referred to by the PSR noted that the defendant was armed with a knife
when the assault and battery took place. Id. at 1236-37. The First Circuit reasoned that the fact
the defendant had a knife when arrested indicated that the conviction arose under the violent
subsection of the assault and battery statute. Id. at 1237.
194 Id. at 1236. The court noted in dicta, however, that it is proper in certain circumstances
for a sentencing court to consider the underlying facts of a prior conviction. Id. The court
provided the specific example of an indictment that used boilerplate language to charge a generic
crime to which the defendant pled guilty, leaving no jury instructions and thus making it
impossible to determine which variation of a crime was actually charged. Id.
1 " Id. The Ninth Circuit, in the dicta of a recent unpublished opinion, endorsed the First
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One commentator criticized the dicta in Harris, which allowed for
expanded use of PSR's, as directly controverting the Supreme Court's
avoidance of "mini trials" under the categorical approach.'" On its
face, the Harris court's interpretation seems inconsistent with the with
formal categorical approach.' [7 One can argue, however, that courts
use the facts of the prior conviction obtained from the PSR only to
clarify the elemental definition of the prior offense and not to assess
the violent nature of the underlying conduct)" It remains unclear how
courts interpreting the three-strikes law will proceed when faced with
situations similar to those found in Harris.
2. Nonenumerated-Inherent Serious Violent Felonies
Courts classifying prior offenses as nonenumerated-inherent seri-
ous violent felonies likely will implement the categorical approach
discussed above in part III.B.1 . 199 Courts first will determine the statu-
tory definition of the prior offenses. 20" Then sentencing courts likely
will make a "common-sense" decision as to whether the statutory con-
duct posed a substantial risk of injury to another. 20 ' Determining
whether the elements of a prior offense are inherently violent will be
a matter of law, and thus will form one of the only areas of judicial
discretion built into the three-strikes law."'
Courts analyzing prior nonenumerated-inherent offenses in the
ACCA context have addressed an interesting issue regarding the types
of sources courts should use in ascertaining the elemental definition
of a prior offense. 2" Courts applying the categorical approach in the
three-strikes context probably will have to confront the same issue. In
United States v. Becker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that a sentencing court could rely upon a judicially im-
posed element, not found in the state's statutory definition, to qualify
Circuit's approach that allows sentencing courts to consider information in PSR's• See Unites
States v. Hensley, No. 94-30148, 1995 WL 37326, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 1995).
1 "Gunn, supra note 191, at 67.
1 117 Id.
"8 See United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234, 1236 (1st Cir. 1992).
1" See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990); United States v, Davis, 16 F.3d 212,
217-18 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 354 (1999); United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1363
(4th Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994).
200 See United States v. Thomas, 2 F.3d 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1194
(1994); United States v. Payne, 966 F.3d 4, 5 (1st Cir, 1992).
201 Curtis, 988 F.2d at 1363.
202 See id.
205 United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Becker, 919
F.2d 568, 571 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991).
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a prior conviction as a crime of violence under the Career Offender
provision.'" In Becker, the defendant appealed the use of a prior Cali-
fornia first-degree burglary conviction for enhancement purposes un-
der the Career Offender provision."' The Ninth Circuit stated that the
California Supreme Court imposed an additional "unlawful entry"
requirement for a conviction of first-degree burglary. 206 The statutory
definition of the crime did not include this requirement. 207 The court
then reasoned that the conduct prohibited by the full inferred defini-
tion, illegal entry of a residence with intent to commit a felony, inher-
ently posed a substantial risk of harm toward another. 208 The Ninth
Circuit concluded, therefore, that the California first-degree burglary
conviction qualified as a nonenumerated-inherent violent felony. 209
Thus, sentencing courts applying the three-strikes law probably will
also consider relevant state court interpretations of state criminal statu-
tory definitions when qualifying prior convictions. 21 °
C. Three-Strikes Categorical Approach Summary
Courts interpreting the three-strikes law likely will apply the Taylor
categorical approach as developed in the ACCA and Career Offender
contexts. 211 After the government proves the existence of the prior
convictions listed in its pretrial information, sentencing courts will
determine the statutory definition of the prior offense.212 Courts will
look to both the language of the statute as enacted by the legislature
and any judicially imposed elements. 2 '' Sentencing courts likely will
employ a modified categorical inquiry to resolve any ambiguities that
exist with respect to what specific elements comprised the prior con-
viction. 2 " Courts using a modified categorical approach will consider
charging papers, jury instructions, verdict forms and possibly other
204 Becker, 919 F.2d at 571 n.5.
200 1d. at 569.
206 Id. at 571 n.5.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 573.
Becker, 919 F.2d at 573.
210 See id.
2 " See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
212 Cf. United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
213 See United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1993) (language of statute); Becker,
919 F.2d at 571 n.5. (judicially imposed elements).
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court documents to determine what specific elements the fact finder
had to find in order to convict the defendant of the prior crime. 215
After determining the prior offense's elemental definition, sen-
tencing courts will attempt to categorize it as a qualifying enumerated
or nonenumerated serious violent felony. 216 The qualification of the
prior offenses depends upon on the match between the prior crimes'
elemental definitions and those of the enumerated crimes and the
nonenumerated crimes.21 Under the ACCA and the Career Offender
provision, classification of a prior crime as a violent felony is the
stopping point for sentencing courts' inquiries. Under the three-strikes
law, however, sentencing courts must go one step further and consider
a defendant's collateral challenge to the use of certain prior convie-
tionsY 8
IV. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COLLATERAL REVIEW DURING
CLASSIFICATION OF PRIOR OFFENSES AS SERIOUS VIOLENT FELONIES
The defendant's express right to preclude the use of a limited class
of otherwise qualified prior convictions through a collateral review
process forms one of the unique features of the new three-strikes law. 21 °
Neither the ACCA nor the Career Offender provision provides for a
defendant's affirmative challenges to the inclusion of a prior offense
for sentence enhancement. 22° Robbery, arson and prior offenses falling
into the nonenumerated category are the only types of convictions that
215 See supra notes 171-77,185-93 and accompanying text..
216 See supra notes 153-210 and accompanying text.
217 .% id,
218
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (3).
219 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (3).
22° See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); USSC § 4B1.1—.2. In 1994, in Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
1732,1738-39 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that defendants may seek collateral
review of a prior conviction only when claiming that the conviction was obtained in complete
violation of the defendants' right to counsel. The defendant had sought to preclude a prior
conviction from counting under the ACCA because of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of his Sixth Amendment right. Id. at 1734. The Court rejected the defendant's conten-
tion and held that the only avenue of direct collateral attack on ACCA prior convictions was via
a claim of failure to be appointed counsel. Id. at 1738. Circuit courts have widely held that this
decision controls in the Career Offender context. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 42 F.3d 823,
824 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Custis in Career Offender context); United States v. Killion, 30 F.3d
844,846 (7th Cir. 1994) (same). The three-strikes taw allows collateral attacks on prior convictions
on three narrow factual issues. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (3). Sentencing courts applying the three-
strikes law will likely follow the Custis rationale and not allow collateral attacks beyond the three
defined narrow issues. Cf. Custis, 114 S. Ct at 173; Mamas, 42 F.3d at 824.
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defendants may collaterally challenge. 221 To preclude the use of a
robbery or nonenumerated conviction, the defendants must prove
three facts by clear and convincing evidence, collectively termed the
"non-violent elements."222 First, defendants seeking to prevent the use
of otherwise qualified nonenumerated crimes or robbery must prove
that no firearm or other dangerous weapon was used in the offense.223
Second, defendants must demonstrate that the prior offense did not
involve any threat of use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon. 224
Finally, defendants must prove that the offense did not result in death
or serious bodily harm. 22' The collateral review provision mandates the
factual approach directly rejected by the Supreme Court in Taylor. 26
In light of the harsh penalty imposed by the three-strikes law, a
collateral review provision makes sense. The collateral review process
provides for a degree of judicial discretion not found in either the
ACCA or the Career Offender provision. 227 Through this provision,
Congress likely sought to grant judges increased discretion to prevent
the three-strikes law from ensnaring non-violent felons in life sen-
221 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(0(3).
222 id. The relevant portion of the statute is set out below:
Nonqualifying felonies, [include] [r]obbery, an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation
to commit robbery; or an offense described in paragraph (2) (F) (ii) shall not serve
as a basis for sentencing under this subsection if the defendant establishes by clear
and convincing evidence that-
(i) no firearm or other dangerous weapon was used in the offense and no threat
of use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon was involved in the offense; and
(ii) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury (as defined in section
1365) to any person.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c)(3) (A). The three-strikes law also allows defendants to prevent the use of
prior arson convictions where the defendant can establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the offense posed no threat to human life and the defendant reasonably believed the offense
posed no threat to human life. 18 U.S.CA. § 3559(c)(3)(B).
In 1993, in Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517, 519-24 (1993), the United States Supreme Court
reviewed the constitutionality of a defendant collateral review provision in a Kentucky persistent
felony offender statute. The Kentucky recidivist statute, like the federal three-strikes law, allows
the defendant to challenge the use of prior convictions and places the burden of proof on the
defendant. See id. The Court held that this burden shifting scheme was well within constitutional
bounds. Id. at 517.
2" 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c)(3)(A)(i). The three-strikes law does not specifically define the
terms dangerous weapon or firearm.
224 18 U.S.C.A. § 5559(c)(3) (A) (i).
225 18 U.S.CA. § 3559(c) (2) (A) (ii). Serious bodily injury is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1365 and
includes "bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, extreme physical pain, pro-
tracted and obvious disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily
member, organ or mental faculty." 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (g)(3) (1988).
226 See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
227 See United States v. Custis, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1739 (1994) (no general collateral attack
allowance found in ACCA); United States v. Thomas, 42 F.3d 823, 824 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying
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tences.228 The initial Senate three-strike proposals, which bear little
resemblance to the adopted House version, did not contain collateral
review provisions. 229 No legislative history exists explaining why the
House of Representatives employed a collateral review provision. The
floor debate accompanying a House amendment to the collateral re-
view subsection indicates that Congress generally desired to sharply
focus the three-strikes law to remove those individuals who repeatedly
threatened their fellow citizens. 28" Therefore, Congress presumably
enacted the collateral review provision as one method of focusing the
application of mandatory life sentences.z"t
A. Criticism of the Collateral Attack Scheme
Though allowing for collateral review of prior convictions makes
good sense in general, two significant problems exist with the three-
strikes collateral review provisions as drafted. First, defendants attempt-
ing to preclude the use of nonenumerated offenses may face severe
evidentiary problems in meeting the clear and convincing burden of
Custis in Career Offender context). See supra note 220 for a full discussion of the lack of review
under the ACCA and Career Offender program. By allowing collateral review based on the
conduct underlying the prior offenses, Congress granted sentencing courts the discretion to focus
their sentencing power on those truly recidivist offenders.
225 One of the principal judicial complaints about similar mandatory sentence provisions is
the lack of judicial discretion to provide individualized sentencing, forcing similar sentences for
dissimilar criminal activity. United States v. Angiulo, 852 F. Stipp. 54, 60 (1). Mass. 1994) (quoting
Jose A. Cabranes, Incoherent Sentencing Guidelines, WALL Sr. J., Aug. 28, 1992, at All).
229 H.12, 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 2408, 5111 (1993).
230 140 Cow.. Rae. 112432 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement by Rep. Hoyer).
231 Itis possible to construct a scenario where, absent a collateral review provision, a defen-
dant with a relatively non-violent criminal history could receive life imprisonment. For example,
assume John Doe was arrested . in 1995 for trying to pick the pocket of a tourist in Yosemite
National Park. Because the offense occurred on federal territory, Doe was charged and convicted
of robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2111.
Doe has two prior convictions. The first was a 1986 California conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, to wit, 50 or more grams of crack cocaine, Doe was
sentenced to two years imprisonment and five years probation. He served six months jail time
and then went on probation. This offense would qualify as a serious drug felony under the
three-strikes law, because if prosecuted in federal court it could have resulted in a conviction
under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (2)(14) (6).
Assume Doe was arrested in Nevada for breaking and entering a commercial warehouse at
night while on probation for the California drug offense. Doe was charged and convicted of this
crime in 1989, and because he was on probation at the time of the offense, Doe was suhject to a
possible 15-year prison sentence. Assume that Doe received a six-month jail sentence, served one
month and was released. This crime would likely qualify as a nonenumerated-inherent crime
because of the perceived likelihood of confrontation from a night-time breaking and entering.
See United States v, Davis, 16 E3d 212, 215 (7th Cir.) (holding that breaking and entering
conviction involved risk of substantial bodily harm because of possible confrontation when
someone interrupts intruder), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 354 (1994). Thus, without a chance to prove
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proof. This could render the protection offered by the collateral review
provision moot. Secondly, Congress's failure to delineate a procedural
framework for the collateral review process will compound these evi-
dentiary problems. These problems could lead to disparate sentencing
schemes among the circuit courts of appeal, directly controverting
Congress's goal of uniformity in sentencing for defendants with similar
criminal records."'
1. Collateral Review Elements Not at Issue During Prior Offenses
Defendants likely will face significant evidentiary problems when
attempting to prove the three non-violent elements necessary to pre-
clude the use of a prior conviction. As stated above, a defendant must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prior offense both did
not involve the use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous
weapon, and did not result in death or serious bodily harm. 233 The
problem arises when at least one of the three non-violent elements was
not an essential element of proof or otherwise at issue in the prior
conviction. Defendants attempting to meet the clear and convincing
burden of proof during the three-strikes sentencing phase would be
forced to seek out witnesses and extrinsic evidence to support an
assertion that was not subject to the adversarial process in the prior
proceeding.
Meeting this burden of proof likely will prove most difficult for
those defendants with older convictions because they are less likely to
have access to the evidence necessary to prove their factual assertions.
This controverts the general sentencing principle that time should
dilute, not magnify, older convictions. 294 For example, in the ACCA
that the conduct surrounding the breaking and entering conviction neither involved the use or
attempted use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, nor resulted in serious bodily harm, a
sentencing court would have to impose mandatory life imprisonment. Such a result seems unfair
and is the type of inequity that the collateral review provision seeks to prevent.
232 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(f) (1988) (setting out guiding principles for the United States Sen-
tencing Commission).
2" 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (3).
234 See United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1993). A statute of limitations, like
that found in § 411 of the Controlled Substances Act, limiting collateral challenges to only those
convictions less than five years in age, is inappropriate in this context. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(e).
Unlike § 411, the three-strikes collateral review process allows defendants to strike only at the
validity of specific factual assertions, not the convictions themselves. Id. Sufficient motivation
should have existed to cause a defendant independently to appeal infirm convictions; putting a
five-year cap on expansion thus prevents frivolous attacks on prior convictions. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 851(c). But the specific factual assertions associated with the three-strikes collateral review were
not even considered at a prior conviction, so there is insufficient motivation independently to
challenge their existence.
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context attempted burglary and attempted breaking and entering are
common types of crimes that courts qualify as a nonenumerated vio-
lent felonies.2"' The use of a gun or injury to another are not required
elements of proof in these prior convictions, making it unlikely that
any witnesses or related extrinsic evidence was ever introduced at the
prior proceeding. This is especially true where the prior conviction
occurred by a guilty plea that generated no trial record. Thus, a
defendant trying to meet his or her affirmative burden of proof must
locate new witnesses and evidence related to an incident that may have
happened many years in the past. Although the Supreme Court has
upheld this type of burden shifting, it seems unfair to make a factual
circumstance that was never subject to the crucible of the adversarial
process the deciding factor in the determination of a sentence of life
imprisonment. 2g6
2. No Collateral Review Process Delineated
The lack of a delineated procedural framework for conducting
collateral review of prior convictions almost certainly will cause sen-
tencing disparity when the provision is applied. The Supreme Court
in Taylor considered and rejected the factual approach, noting several
distinct problems that would result from the elaborate fact finding
process required."' The Court declined to place the burden of deline-
ating such a process on sentencing courts, implying that the burden
233 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 2 F.3d 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1993) (counting attempted
burglary as violent felony under ACCA because of inherent risk of confrontation), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1194 (1994); United States v. O'Brien, 972 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding attempted
breaking and entering did not have violence element a nonenumerated-inherent violent felony
must have under ACCA), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 210 (1993).
236 See Parke v, Raley. 113 S. Ct. 517, 525 (1992). It is a well decided tenet of sentencing law
that courts may consider all relevant non-charged conduct when making sentencing decisions,
even acquitted conduct. E.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 92 (1986) (holding sentenc-
ing court may consider uncharged conduct proven by preponderance of evidence); Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (holding ability of sentencing court to obtain pertinent
information not limited by rules of evidence).
The earlier uncharged conduct may receive the attention of the adversarial system in the
three•strikes sentencing process. This discussion, however, will likely suffer due to poor quality
and lack of evidence available at the later proceeding. Several good law review articles have
addressed the inequities posed by the consideration of uncharged conduct in sentencing. E.g.,
Lear, supra note 63, at 744-45; Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real.Offease Sentenc-
ing, 45 STAN. L. RAY. 523 (1993) (providing a fresh alternative to the sentencing system as it exists
today); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733 (1980). The
Supreme Court in Taylor identified a potential constitutional infirmity in the use of prior un-
charged conduct. United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990).
237
 Taylor, 495 U.S at 601-02.
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more rightly belonged to Congress.'" Neither the language of the
three strikes law nor its legislative history provides any guidance as to
how sentencing courts should implement this factual inquiry. Thus,
sentencing courts must determine independently how they will pro-
ceed. Without an established review procedure it will be difficult to
guarantee that each defendant will be able to exercise his or her rights
granted by the law.
A number of questions arise as to the manner in which the court
will gather information necessary for its decision to preclude the use
of a prior conviction. Defendants seeking to exclude the use of a prior
conviction must prove several factual assertions.'" Whether sentencing
courts will conduct full evidentiary hearings in every case or rather
grant hearings only to those defendants whose claims pass some thresh-
old burden of proof remains unclear. Moreover, what type of evidence
courts will allow the defendant to present also remains unclear. Courts
also will face the question of whether to rely solely on the presentence
report and the parties' written statements and affidavits or to allow the
defendant to present witnesses and extrinsic evidence. Additionally,
courts must determine what evidence the government will be allowed
to present to rebut the defendant's assertions. The complexity of these
questions means that many possible solutions exist. Without guidance
from Congress, the different circuits are likely to develop their own
judicially mandated procedures that will inevitably vary from one an-
other, causing unwanted sentencing disparity.'"
If Congress does not act to provide further guidance, sentencing
courts are likely to turn to one of two places for an example of a
method of structuring a collateral review. Some courts may apply the
informal Guidelines procedure currently used to resolve disputed fac-
tors in presentencing investigations:24 ' Alternatively, because the three-
strikes statute requires the government to meet the notification re-
quirements of section 411(a) of the Controlled Substances Act, some
courts may adopt the other provisions of section 411. 242 Specifically,
section 411 in full provides a procedural framework for sentencing
23" See id.
299 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (3).
240
	
of the guiding principles of sentencing law is reduction of unwarranted sentence
disparities. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)( I ) (B) (1988).
241 See THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON & DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW & PRACTICE
§ 6A1.3 (1989 & Supp. 1991) for a discussion of the development of a more formal procedure
for resolution of PSR disputes.
242 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c)(4). The relative portions of § 851 are set out below:
If the Person denies any allegation of the information of prior conviction, or claims
that any conviction alleged is invalid, he shall file a written response to the infor-
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courts establishing the existence of prior convictions used to increase
the prison sentence of defendants convicted of serious drug felonies. 243
This second choice seems the more prudent course to follow because
the procedure is more established and thus provides a more structured
approach than the Guidelines' disputed factors analysis. 244 Following
section 411's more settled procedure creates less room for interpreta-
tion by the courts, thus decreasing the likelihood of disparity in sen-
tencing based on procedural differences among the circuits.
V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
In general, the federal three-strikes law effectively isolates the
hard-core class of violent repeat offenders—the intended focus of the
law's powers.245 Congress must consider, however, enacting additional
legislation delineating a procedural framework for the law's collateral
review process. This will prevent the sentencing disparity that will arise
as each circuit independently determines how it will implement the
collateral review process. Additionally, Congress should pass separate
legislation requiring that all courts, state and federal, make and report
four key findings after every felony criminal conviction for their inclu-
sion in the National Felony Classification System, a criminal history
data base. Subsequent sentencing courts easily could access this data
base rather than wasting judicial resources associated with recreating
the specifics of a prior offense.
A. Three-Strikes Procedural Framework
Congress must establish a procedural framework for the collateral
challenge provision of the three-strikes law. The collateral review pro-
vision mandates a factual inquiry into the conduct surrounding a prior
!nation. A copy of the response shall be served upon the United States attorney.
The court shall hold a hearing to determine any issues raised by the response which
would except the person from increased punishment. . . . The hearing shall be
before the court without a jury and either party may introduce evidence.... At the
request of either party, the court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.
A person claiming that a conviction alleged in the information was obtained in
violation of the Constitution of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the
factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to the information. The
person shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on any
issue of fact raised by the response.
21 U.S.C. § 85I(c) (1988).
24321 U.S.0 § 851.
244 See generally United States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 886 (9th Cir. 1994).
245 1-1.R. Rap. No. 463, supra note 4, at 3.
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conviction.2" A number of questions exist as to the manner in which
sentencing courts will gather the information necessary to their deci-
sion. 247 As stated above, the complexity of these questions will almost
certainly result in sentencing disparity as courts conduct the collateral
review process in a wide variety of manners. Thus, the process available
to a defendant collaterally attacking a prior conviction in a three-strikes
sentencing situation will depend on the venue in which the case re-
sides. 248 This is neither desirable nor necessary. Congress should enact
a uniform procedural framework guaranteeing defendants equal ac-
cess to a full collateral review process.
The procedure established in section 411 of the Controlled Sub-
stance Act provides a good starting point.'" The three-strikes law al-
ready requires the government to file a pre-trial information in con-
formance with section 411(a), listing the prior convictions the
government intends to use for sentence enhancement."° Drawing fur-
ther from section 411, Congress should require the defendant to file
a written response to the government's pre-trial information. 25 ' Spe-
cifically, defendants should summarize the form and substance of all
evidence they will present in support of the factual assertions necessary
to preclude a prior conviction's usage: whether the prior offense in-
volved the use, or threatened use, of a firearm or other dangerous
weapon, and whether the prior offense resulted in death or serious
bodily injury. 252 This written response will allow courts to determine
the necessity of a full evidentiary hearing. Congress should grant courts
discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing if the defendant's written
response does not allege any factual support of each of the three
assertions necessary to preclude a prior conviction. This gatekeeping
power will prevent needless automatic delays in sentencing caused by
defendants' frivolous challenges to prior convictions, ensuring a more
efficient use of judicial resources. 253 When a court finds that the defen-
dant has alleged a factual basis to support each of the three required
246 See supra notes 219-44 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 239-44, and accompanying text.
248 For instance, one court may cite judicial economy concerns and allow defendants only to
submit written statements, while another may allow defendants to present witnesses and extrinsic
evidence to prove the same point.
246 21 U.S.C. § 851(c).
250 18	 § 3559(c) (4). Section 851 contains the procedure to establish prior convic-
tions for sentence enhancement within the Controlled Substances Act. 21 	 § 851(c).
251 See 21 U.S.C. § 851(c). See supra note 242 for the relevant text of § 851(c).
252 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c)(3) (A).
255 This form of discretion is lacking within the § 851 context. 21 U.S.C. § 851. But a similar
feature prevents frivolous challenges by stating that defendants may only challenge convictions
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assertions, the court must hold an extra-jury evidentiary hearing."'
The defendant should be allowed to present witnesses and evidence to
support his or her claims and must meet a clear and convincing burden
of proof. 255 The government should be allowed to present evidence in
rebuttal of the defendant's claims.
Sentencing courts will face the difficult task of determining what
evidence is sufficient to prove each of the three factual assertions.
When dealing with older convictions, for example twenty or more years
old, it is conceivable that the only evidence available to support the
three assertions will be the defendant's own testimony. This is espe-
cially likely when the prior conviction resulted from a guilty plea and
not a trial. It is unclear how courts should proceed in such situations.
It may come down to a question of whether a court will accept the
word of a thrice-convicted felon as enough grounds to preclude life
imprisonment.
In summary, Congress should enact a procedural framework for
the three-strikes collateral review process in which the defendant must
submit a written response to the government's information. The re-
sponse must summarize the form and substance of the facts the defen-
dant will present in support of the three factual assertions necessary
to preclude the use of a prior conviction: that the prior offense did
not involve the use, or threatened use, of a firearm or other dangerous
weapon and did not result in death or serious bodily injury. Courts
should grant an evidentiary hearing if the defendant has alleged a
factual basis for each necessary assertion. Such a hearing should in-
clude the presentation of witness and other evidence, both by defen-
dant in support of his or her assertions and by the government in
rebuttal of the defendant's claims.
B. Looking Toward the Future
Analysis of the three-strikes law and other federal recidivist laws
indicate that no simple answers exist when determining whether a
criminal's past conviction record warrants life imprisonment. 256 It is a
less than five-years old. 21 U.S.0 § 851(e). As discussed above, a five-year statute of limitations
would be inappropriate in the three-strikes context. See supra note 234.
2" See 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(1).
255 The clear and convincing standard is explicitly established in the three-strikes law. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (3).
256 See supra notes 232-44 and accompanying text describing the complexities associated
with conducting a categorical inquiry into past convictions.
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question that more and more federal and state courts will confront as
they interpret and apply their own three-strikes laws. 257 The effective-
ness of these recidivist sentencing schemes depends in large part on a
court's ability to decipher a defendant's prior criminal history. Courts
often must expend substantial judicial resources while attempting to
classify a prior offense for sentence enhancement purposes.255 The
whole process could be simplified if whenever a court convicted a
defendant it produced a clear and concise record, taking into consid-
eration that the conviction may have meaning beyond the instant
proceedings. 259 Congress recognized that violent felony recidivism was
a problem of national scope when it enacted the federal three-strikes
law. 26° Congress should take the additional step and enact new legisla-
tion making it easier for both federal and state courts to identify and
severely punish those criminals with violent recidivist criminal histo-
ries.
Congress should require all federal and state courts to conduct a
hearing and to make four specific findings after every felony criminal
conviction. 26 ' Congress should then require that sentencing courts
input these findings into a dedicated data base called the National
Felony Classification System that other courts could easily access in
257 See Heglin, supra note 11, at 215-16; Thomas, supra note 11, at A01.
258 Virtually all states have enacted some statutory scheme that provides for enhanced sen-
tences for defendants with prior felony convictions. See Richard A. Galt, The Use of Out -of-State
Convictions for Enhancing Sentences of Repeat Offenders, 57 ALB. L. REv. 1133, 1133 (1994). The
overwhelming majority of those states use a Tay/or-type categorical approach when considering
out-of-state convictions. See id. at 1134.
25,1
	
is nothing that can be done regarding convictions that exist as of today. The real
benefit of the legislation proposed by this section is that a determination is made by the court
handling the matter immediately after adjudicating the defendant guilty when all relevant facts
are easily accessible to both the defendant and the government. Thus, courts must continue to
use the categorical approach when dealing with existing convictions as the best available alterna-
tive. But the basic thrust of the proposed legislation is that there is no need to accept the status
quo when a more effective alternative is within easy reach.
260 See H.R. REP. No. 463, supra note 4, at 3.
261 A definitional section applicable to the ACCA context provides a workable definition for
"felony criminal conviction":
[C]rime punishable for a term . . . [of imprisonment] exceeding one year [that]
does not include -
any federal or state offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices,
restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business
practices, or any state offense classified by the laws of the state as a misdemeanor
and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (20) (1988). This definition ensures that only serious felony convictions receive
the uniform classification. The scope of the definition is useful because most states provide for
increased sentences based not only on the commission of violent felonies, but also on the
existence of any conforming prior felony conviction. See Galt, supra note 258, at 1133.
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subsequent proceedings. 262
 Initially, for each count that results in a
criminal felony conviction, Congress should mandate that the sentenc-
ing court list the offense's required elements of proof. 2"s In addition,
Congress should direct the sentencing court to make three factual
findings related to the underlying conduct of the prior offense (the
"violence attributes7) . 2"
 First, the sentencing court should determine
whether the prior offense involved the use of a dangerous weapon or
firearm.265
 Second, the sentencing court should find whether the of-
fense involved the threatened use of a firearm or dangerous weapon.
Third, the sentencing court should indicate whether the crime re-
sulted in death or serious bodily harm. 266
Most federal and state courts attempting to use prior convictions
as predicates for subsequent sentence enhancement limit their inquiry
252
 Federalist concerns likely would prevent Congress from making state compliance with the
legislation mandatory. Sufficient precedent exists, however, to link compliance to a state's accep-
tance of some type of discretionary funding. For instance, the 1994 Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act linked federal funding of local prisons to states enacting "truth in sentenc-
ing laws." See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322 §§ 20101-02,
108 Stat. 1796,1815-16. Receipt of prison funding was based on a state's enacting laws that both
require all convicted felons to serve 85% of their imposed prison sentences, and require state
courts to modify their sentencing procedures to allow victims and their families to testify at
sentencing hearings. Id. It is arguable that the requirements of the National Felony Classification
System are less intrusive than the "truth in sentencing laws." See id.
The infrastructure and technology for the National Felony Classification System exist today.
The FBI maintains the National Crime Information Center (the "NCIC"), a national criminal
history data base, but it contains only the dates and labels of offenses, not the type of information
needed to classify a prior offense as a predicate for sentence enhancement. See 28 C.F.R. § 20.20
(1994). Congress could make courts report their required findings as a subset of the NCIC
information, thus limiting the data base's start-up expenses.
2" Reference to an existing statute would be allowed only if it provides a clear indication of
the specific elements.
264
 Consideration of the underlying factual conduct of a prior offense for sentence enhance-
ment seems to run contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Taylor: United States v. Taylor,
495 U.S. 575,600-01 (1990). But the Taylor Court rejected such consideration, not because the
information was not relevant, but because of the practical difficulties associated with a subsequent
determination of such conduct. Id. at 601. In fact, modern concepts of individualized sentencing
have made it necessary for sentencing courts to have as much information about the defendant
and his past conduct as possible. United States v. Williams, 337 U.S. 241,247 (1949).
Congress already has indicated through the three-strikes law collateral review provision that
violent attributes are indicative of whether the prior offense qualified as a serious violent felony.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (3). It seems a reasonable assumption that if any of the violent attrib-
utes—use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, threatened use of a firearm or other danger-
ous weapon, or the death or serious bodily harm of another—accompanied the prior offense,
the offense was violent. See id.
266
 Unlike the federal three-strikes provision, Congress should define 'use," "firearm," "dan-
gerous weapon" and all other terms within the statute.
24' Serious bodily harm would be defined by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
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to the elements of the prior offense. 267 Analogous case law from the
ACCA and Career Offender context indicates that even a simple cate-
gorical inquiry to define the elements of the prior offense can place a
drain on judicial resources.268 Ambiguity regarding the elemental
definition of a prior offense may arise in many ways. A prior offense
may contain several subsections, only one of which qualifies as a predi-
cate, or the prior conviction may be for a generic offense with several
different versions, not all of which qualify as a predicate.266 When such
ambiguity arises, subsequent sentencing courts must wade through the
indictment, jury instructions, verdict forms and other types of "judi-
cially noticeable documentation" to eliminate the ambiguity. 27° Thus,
providing courts easy access to the essential elements of the prior
offense reduces the administrative burden on later courts. Addition-
ally, this ensures that ambiguity over a prior violent felony conviction's
statutory definition never leads to a conviction's rejection as a predi-
cate offense. This goal is accomplished by requiring the court in the
best position to make the determination of violence, the original sen-
tencing court, simply to list and record the essential elements for each
count for which the fact finder establishes the defendant's guilt.
Additionally, a direct benefit arises from providing easy access to
a prior offense's underlying conduct, specifically, enabling a later sen-
tencing court to determine the existence of any attributes of violence.
Putting this information in the hands of later courts allows them to
focus further on those individuals most deserving of increased punish-
ment. Based on fairness and judicial economy concerns, federal courts
rejected a factual inquiry into the conduct underlying prior offenses
for qualification as sentence enhancement predicates. 27 ' But those
rationales disappear when the original court provides the forum in
267 See supra notes 211-18 and accompanying text; see also Galt, supra note 258, at 1134,
1136-37 (stating that most state courts determine whether the elements of the prior out-of-state
conviction would have resulted in an instate conviction of requisite severity).
2614 See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (ACCA case—remand required to
make further determination of elements of prior conviction); United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d
1234, 1236 (1st Cir. 1992) (ACCA case—courts wade through indictment, jury instructions, plea
agreement transcript, presentence report and other judicially noticeable documentation); United
States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) (Career Offender case—court must consider
both legislatively and judicially imposed elements), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991). This is
especially true when the prior conviction was the result of a plea agreement, such that no trial
record or jury instructions exist. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02. The categorical approach itself
is a compromise based on judicial economy. See id. at 601.
269 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601. This is especially true when the prior conviction was the result
of a guilty plea that does not generate any trial record for objective review. Id.
270 See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 79-135 and accompanying text.
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which the underlying conduct is established. Subsequent sentencing
courts never have indicated that the underlying facts of a prior convic-
tion would not assist their crafting of the later sentence. Rather, courts
have been concerned with the inequities associated with a subsequent
proceeding to determine prior facts. 272 The crucible of the adversarial
process, applied immediately after the determination of guilt, will
ensure accurate findings based on sufficient evidence to support or
deny each of the violence attributes.
The new legislation should establish a procedural framework that
mandates a separate hearing after the fact finder establishes the defen-
dant's guilt to determine the existence of the three violent attributes.
The government should be required to prove the existence of each
violent attribute not required for the defendant's conviction by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 2" Both the government and the defen-
dant should have the opportunity to present evidence, thus ensuring
the full benefit of the adversarial process by parties with equal access
to the necessary facts. It is hardly debatable that if the prior offense
involved any of the three violent attributes, then it was a violent of-
fense. Thus, subsequent sentencing courts will be able to rely upon
these findings to determine whether the prior offense was actually
violent and focus on increased punishment of truly violent criminals.
Requiring courts to make the four findings after every conviction
would also serve a subsidiary deterrent purpose. Courts can use the
hearing process to drive home the message that subsequent convic-
tions will result in harsher punishment. Defendants will be on notice
that society is no longer willing to let them continue to repeatedly
commit serious felonies without serious consequences. Thus, Congress
should enact the National Felony Classification System because it will
significantly improve the ability of the criminal justice system to effec-
tively deal with repeat offenders.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal three-strikes provision is a recidivist statute aimed at
putting society's most dangerous criminals in prison for long-term
incarceration. Courts interpreting the statute's serious violent felony
definition are likely to employ the categorical approach developed by
272 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601.
273 Lear, supra note 63, at 733 ("Sentencing facts need only be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence.").
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courts interpreting the similar ACCA and Career Offender provisions.
Unlike existing federal violent felony recidivist statutes, the three-
strikes law provides for a defendant's limited collateral attack against
the inclusion of otherwise qualified prior convictions. Congress should
address collateral review provision inadequacies by providing a proce-
dural framework for defendant challenges. Additionally, Congress
should enact a National Felony Classification System that would pro-
vide state and federal courts greater efficiency and accuracy when
using prior convictions for subsequent sentence enhancement.
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